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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
WEI-~DON

R. REEDER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

-vs.-

GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, a corporation
Defendant and Respondent.

Case
No. 8601

Brief of Respondent
STATEMENT OF FACTS
We feel that a restatement of the facts is necessary
to enable this Court to understand the issues presented
on this appeal. The statement given by appellant is so
incomplete and unrelated to sequence of events that it
is difficult to follow and connect.
The action is for alleged conversion of a 1955 Buick
automobile, which plaintiff claimed to own, in the possession of defendant, and which it is alleged defendant
refused to deliver to him ( R. 1).
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Defendant denied that plaintiff O\vned the car and
that it \vas guilty of converting the same (R. 2).
Plaintiff's evidence showed that Valley Motor Company was a Buick dealer at Logan, under a written contract introduced in evidence by plaintiff (Ex. "A")
(R 12), \vhich provided that the dealer should pay in
cash for each shipment of cars (see par. 3 thereof); that
the dealer is not the agent or legal representative of
seller (see par. 29) ; and that the dealer is solely responsible for all commitments to customers and that seller
shall not be held responsible for any commitments of the
dealer unless it assumes such responsibility in \Vriting
(see par. 30).
On January 3, 1955 plaintiff entered into an agreement with Valley ~Iotor Company to buy a new car (Ex.
''B'') (R 12). Valley Motor Company sent to defendant
an order for the car (Ex. '' B '') to be delivered to
plaintiff at Flint, Michigan, on January 20, 1955, upon
authorization from Valley ~Iotor Company.
Valley Motor Company never paid for the car 1n
cash, pursuant to contract, nor did it do so by use of the
rredit facilities of General Motors Acceptance Corporation (R. 50); nor did plaintiff take delivery of the car
on ,January 20, 1955, or at any other time (R. 20).
On January 18, 1955, defendant delivered to General
Motors Acceptance Corporation a bill of sale covering
the car (Ex. "C' ') for completion of finanring by Valley
2
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~Iotor

Company, at which time a trust receipt and promissory note were prepared by G.M.A.C. and held in its
files until Jan nary 31, 1955, when they were returned to
defendant (Ex. "E "). Exhibit "C" reads as follows:
''To General Motors Acceptance Corporation
(hereinafter referred to as G.M.A.C.):
The undersigned dealer, hereinafter referred
to as the trustee, hereby accepts delivery and possession of the above described property under the
conditions and for the purposes herein expressed:
1. Title to said property remains in G.M.A.C.
as security retained for and until the trustee's payment in cash of the amount of his
(its, their) promissory note of same identification number.
2. Said property is in the possession of the
trustee hereunder at his (its, their) sole risk
of all loss or injury for the purpose of storing and exhibiting same preliminary to and
in procuring the sale thereof.
3. The trustee agrees to keep said property
free of all taxes, liens, and encumbrances, to
keep said property brand-new and subject
to inspection and not to use or operate same
for demonstration or otherwise without express permission except as may be necessary
to drive same from freight depot or from
receiving city to trustee's place of business,
at trustee's risk en route, against all loss and
damage to said property, persons or other
property; not to sell, loan, pledge, mortgage,
or otherwise dispose of said property until
payment of said amount and not to use said
property illegally, improperly or for hire.
3
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4. In the event of trustee's default in payment
under and according to said promissory note
or not complying \vith the terms and conditions hereof, and in the event of trustee's
bankruptcy, insolvency or receivership, or
G. l\L A. C. deems itself insecure or said
property or any part thereof in danger of
misuse, loss, seizure or confiscation G.M.A.C.
may take immediate possession of said property without demand or legal process, and
for this purpose may enter upon the premises wherever said property may be and remove same. Thereupon G.M.A.C. may, at
its election either (a) sell said property
upon notice at public or private sale for the
trustee's account, or (b) declare the transaction and the trustee's obligation under said
promissory note to be terminated and cancelled and retain any sums of money paid
by the trustee as a deposit on delivery hereunder. Recorded on the 'date of execution'
specified above.''
Plaintiff never had title to the car (R. 28); never had
possession of the car (R. 28); never paid defendant the
purchase price of the car; and never had a.ny contractual
relationship with defendant relating to acquisition of
title to the car (R. 27 -28).
Valley Motor Company neYer had title to the car
(Ex. 1) ; never had actual possession of the car; and had
no eontract \vith defendant for acquisition of title excepti ug for cash (Ex. 1). General I\Iotors . A. cceptance Corporation held title until January 31, 1955, and \Yas not to con,~p~r title to 'Talley until the car "~as paid for (Ex. "C"),
4
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which was never done. Plaintiff offered no evidence that
either defendant or G. l\1. A. C. was ever paid for the car.
In the meantime, Valley Motor Company lost its
credit standing and the trust receipt and the title papers
were returned to defendant (R. 50-51). See Ex. "E."
Plaintiff testified that on January 25, 1955, he called
defendant's office in Michigan and talked to some unidentified individual who advised him that his car was there
and had been since January 20th (R. 36); that on the
24th day of January, 1955, plaintiff was advised not to
go to Flint for the car (R. 45), but nevertheless on January 27, 1955, he went to defendant's plant in Michigan,
talked to a Mr. Burkhart and was advised that the car
was not there; it had been reshipped (R. 26).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
THE JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL COURT IN
DENYING PLAINTIFF RECOVERY FOR CONVERSION WAS CORRECT, BECAUSE:
(a) PLAINTIFF DID NOT SHOW TITLE TO

CAR·

'

(b) PLAINTIFF DID NOT SHOW ANY CONTRACTUAL OBLIG.A.TION ON THE PART
OF DEFENDANT TO DELIVER TITLE TO
PLAINTIFF; AND
5
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(c)

PI~.AINTIFF

DID NOT SHOW ANY CONDUCT ON THE PART OF DEFENDANT
WHICH WOULD ESTOP IT FROM DENYING TITLE TO THE CAR TO BE IN
PLAINTIFF.
ARGUMENT

The judgment of the trial court in denying plaintiff
recovery for conversion was correct, because:
(a) Plaintiff did not sho"\\ title to the car;
7

(b) Plaintiff did not show any contractual obligation on the part of defendant to deliver title to
plaintiff; and
(c) Plaintiff did not sho'v any conduct on the part
of defendant which 'vould stop it from denying
title to the car to be in plaintiff.
This is an action for c'onversion based upon plaintiff's alleged ownership of the car. Where right to possession is based upon ownership and title, plaintiff must
prove that fact. The rule is well stated in cases from this
Court:

Mads en v.
follows:

lJf adse1r,

269 Pac. 132, 72 Utah 96, as

''A conversion of personal property is defined as an unauthorized assumption and exercise
of the right of ownership over goods or personal
chattels of another to the alteration of their con-
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clition or the exclusion of the owner's rights, and
'trover' is the technical name of the common-law
action provided for the redress thereof ( 38 Cyc.
2005), and the measure of damages for conversion
when property is not returned is the value of the
property at the time of the conversion, plus
interest.''

Johnson v.

Flo~vers,

228 Pae. 2d 406, 119 Utah 425:

''The general rule is announced in 53 Am.
J ur., Trover and Conversion, p. 863-4, Sec. 68, a.s
follows: 'The general rule is that an action for
conversion is not maintainable unless the plaintiff,
at the time of the alleged conversion, is entitled to
the immediate possession of the property. An interest in the property which does not carry with it
a right to possession is not sufficient; the right to
maintain the action may not be based upon a right
to possession at a future time.' ''

Larsen v. Knight, 233 Pac. 2d 365, 120 Utah 261:
" 'The general rule is that an action for conversion is not maintainable unless the plaintiff,
at the time of the alleged conversion, is entitled
to the immediate possession of the property.' 53
Am. J. 863; Johnson v. Flo~vers, Utah, 228 P. 2d
406. ''

Christensen v. Pugh, 36 Pac. 2d 100, 84 Utah 440:
''Conversion is any unauthorized act of dominion or ownership exercised by one person over
the personal property of another in denial of his
right in the property, or inconsistent with it.
Cooley on Torts (4th Ed.) Sec. 331. The most frequently quoted definition is that in 2 Greenleaf on
Evd., Sec. 642: 'Conversion consists either in the
appropriation of a thing to the party's own use
and beneficial enjoyment, or in its destruction, or
in exercising dominion over it, in exclusion or de7
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

fiance of the ottvner's right, or in withholding the
possession of the property from the owner under
a claim of title inconsistent 'lvith his own.' Under
all the authorities where transfer of possession
was had by the owner's consent, even though under misrepresentation as to the purpose for the
transfer, until some act is done by the bailee which
is a denial, or violation, or disregard, of the
ottV111cr' s rights in the property, conversion will not
lie. The gist of conversion is not the acquisition of
property by a wrongdoer, but the wrongful deprivation of it to the owner.''

See also Lee Woodttvorking Company v. Hub Plating Works, 217 Fed. 2d 453:
"It is fundamental that the plaintiff would
be required to prove title to the property and the
right to immediate possession before it could
recover in trover. Nettleton v. Kerr, 167 Ill. App.
74; Ridge v. Giffrow, 220 Ill. App. 590."
Since this is the general rule \Ye shall cite no further cases.
Plaintiff, by his own evidence, showed title and right
to possession in General I\lotors Corporation, defendant,
under the terms of Exhibit 1 until it was paid in cash for
the car.
He also proved by his evidence, assuming the transaction with General Motors Acceptance Corporation to
have been completed, "Thich it \Yas not because the papers
\vere still in the hands of G.l\1 ....'-\.C., that title to the car
and right of possession "Tt:"~re in G.J\I ....\.C. until the car
was paid for. Neither title or possession, or the right
8
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to title, passed from defendant and G.M.A.C. according
to plaintiff's own evidence.
Since neither General Motors or G.M.A.C. was ever
paid for the car by either Valley or plaintiff, there the
matter of title and right to possession rests so far as
this case is concerned, according to the written documents presented by plaintiff himself.
Plaintiff seeks to overcome this obvious defect in
his case by two arguments :
1. That he was told by some unidentified telephone
operator over long distance phone on January 25,
1956, that his car was ready for him; and
2. That the Valley 1Iotor Company, by reason of
the trust receipt (Ex. C) became trustee of the
title for plaintiff; and that since plaintiff had
theretofore made a contract with Valley for purchase of the car, plaintiff had the right as third
party beneficiary to title and possession as
against General Motors and G.M.A.C., notwithstanding the wording of the contract papers.
We shall discuss these two propositions in the order
stated.

1.
TELEPHONE CONVERSATION
A telephone conversation with some unidentified telephone operator was insufficient to divest defendant or
9
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G.~1 ..i\...C.

of title to the car as established by the '''"ritten
contract documents introduced in evidence by plaintiff.
Plaintiff seems to place great weight upon this alleged
conversation. In the absence of any showing as to the
identity and authority of this telephone operator, this is
completely answered by the case of Utah Foundry & Machine Company v. Utah Gas & Coke Co., 131 Pac. 1173,
42 Utah 533. In that case plaintiff brought action for
moneys due for iron castings sold to defendant. Defendant counterclaimed for conversion. One Wright was
agent for defendant and allegedly unlawfully sold iron to
one Croft. This Court laid down the following rule as to
the authority of an agent as follows :
''There is the evidence of Croft, Sr.'s admission
that he received iron from Wright; that he paid
him for it; and that he presumed Wright had paid
it to the defendant.
*
*
*
:1:
''The admission of Croft, Sr., was not a binding
admission of the plaintiff. He was the secretary of
the plaintiff corporation, and its bookkeeper, and
collector. The rule is u'ell settled that, to bind the
principal with an admission. of his agent, the declara.tion or statement of the agent 1nust have been
made ttoithin the scope of his employment and during the transaction of business by him for the
tJrincipal and in relation to such bu,siness; that is,
the declaration or statement of the agent must be
contemporaneous "'"ith or in the course of the
business or transaction and in relation thereto
conducted by the agent for the principal within
the scope of the agency. The declarations or statements of the agent here 'Yere not made under any
such circumstance. They were made long after the
transactions with respect to "'"hich they were de-

10
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clared had "rholly ended, long after the business
had been conducted, and were not made in the
course of nor in relation to any business which the
agent 'vas then transacting or conducting for the
principal. Certainly, an agent not in the course
or transaction of any business for his principal,
may not on the public mart or elsewhere make
binding admissions of fact against his principal
by a mere narration of facts relating to transactions wholly ended and long past. Property rights
of the principal cannot be bartered away in any
such manner as that." (Italics supplied)
The written contract, Sec. 35, Ex. 1, expressly precluded the authority of anyone to alter the contract by
oral commitment, and certainly an unidentified telephone
operator could not do it.

2.
TRUST RECEIPT ACT AND SALES ACT
Plaintiff seeks by some type of legal gymnastics to
write his name as beneficiary of the trust receipt written
up by G.M.A.C., held in its files, never delivered to Valley,
and subsequently returned to defendant. He would delete the entire wording of the document itself which explessly states on its face, if it were supposed that it had
become a valid document, that title toas to remain in
G.M ..A.C. until it was paid for the car by Valley, and
expressly negatived the right of Valley to sell or convey
the car. Valley was not trustee of the title, a,s arguer/ by
plaintiff. G.M.A.C. held title. Valley was to haue ha.d
11
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only a qualified and limited right of possession, which it
n.ever took.

By what legal sophistry can a court be urged to write
into a document something that is not there, and delete
from a document what is expressly written into it' This
Court has many times held in no uncertain terms that
the function of a court is to interpret written documents,
not to rewrite the contract to suit litigants. It is not necessary to cite cases on a proposition as fundamental as
this.
In the first place, the Trust Receipts Act of either
Utah or Michigan has no place in this case. The trustee
(Valley) was never given title to be held in trust. If
plaintiff felt that he had some case under the Michigan
law, by reason of this trust receipt (Ex. C), it would
have to be an action against G.M.A.C. for violation of
the trust document. He would have to allege and prove
the Michigan law, and then prove some obligation on
the part of G.M.A.C. to deliver title to plaintiff in spite
of and notwithstanding the express "\Yording of the trust
receipt to the contrary. The Utah Trust Receipts Act has
no place in the case "Thatsoever. That part of the transaction took place in Michigan and the documents never
left the possession of G.M.A.C. in ~Iichigan. The express wording of the statute under the definition of trustee is that the trustee is one "Tho has possession of property or documents under a trust receipt. Valley never had
actual possession or title.

12
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The purpose of the Trust Receipts Act, if it had
anything to do with this case, is to permit the warehousing of merchandise, with title retaining features,
'vithout compliance \vith the recording statutes of the
State where the \varehousing is to be done. Nowhere does
the Trust Receipts Act invalidate the terms and provisions of the trust documents, and this is particularly
true where the title and possession are retained by the
en trustor.
Sec. 9-2-1, UCA, 1'953, expressly states that it applies
only to a sale by the trustee for new vaZ.ue, where the
goods are sold and delivered for nezc value, or where the
delivery is made on a pre-existing contract for cash or on
credit.
Plaintiff's purchase contract with Valley was on Jannary 3, 1955, at which time he turned in his old car to
Valley. This was fifteen days before the date of the trust
receipt. There is no evidence that he thereafter gave any
new value to either Valley or defendant G.M.A.C.
Plaintiff never had delivery of the car from anyone.
Counsel's argument that delivery of the car by defendant to its own Customer Drive-Away department constituted delivery to plaintiff is so fantastic and so unrealistic as to require no answer.
The purpose of Sec. 9-2-1 of the Trust Receipts Act,
if it were applicable, is to create an estoppel against the
entrustor (in this case it would be G.M.A.C.) in favor of
a subsequent purchaser who parts with n.ew value and
13
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who takes deli1:ery from a trustee in possession of the
property, or a prior purchaser who subsequently parts
with new value by "\\ray of cash or credit and who takes
delivery from a trustee in possession. Plaintiff does not
fit into this picture by any stretch of the imagination.
Whatever of value he parted with was on January 3,
1955, and the contract that he signed was on the same
date, fifteen days prior to the date of the trust receipt,
and plaintiff never at any time parted with any value to
Valley after the date of the trust receipt; and the alleged
trustee never had possession, which is the very basis of
applicability of the Trust Receipts Act.
The same general principles are set forth in our
Sales Act (Sec. 60-2-7, UCA 1953) which reads as follows:
''Sale by a person not the owner.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this title, where goods are
sold by a person who is not the owner thereof, and
who does not sell them under the authority or with
the consent of the owner, the buyer acquires no
better title to the goods than the seller had, unless
the owner of the goods is by his conduct precluded
from denying the seller's authority to sell.
"(2) Nothing in this title, however, shall
effect:
'' (a) The provisions of any factors' acts, recording acts, or any enactment enabling the apparent owner of goods to dispose of them as if he
were the true owner thereof.
''(b) The validity of any contract to sell or sale
under any special common la-w· or statutory power
of sale, or under the order of a court of competent
jurisdiction.''

14
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See also ~'Jchwartz v. lVhite, 13 Pac. 2d 643, and
Tho·Jnas Y. Farrell, 26 Pac. 2d 328. Both are Utah cases.
The various elements to constitute an estoppel in all
of its phases has been clearly set forth in the Utah case
of Barber v. Anderson, 274 P. 136:
" 'In conformity with the principle already
stated 'vhich lies at the basis of the doctrine, and
upon the authority of decisions "rhich have recognized and adopted that principle, the following
are the essential elements which enter into and
form a part of an equitable estoppel in all of its
phases and applications. One caution, however, is
necessary and very important. It would be unsafe
and misleading to rely on these general requisites
as applicable to every case, 'vithout examining the
instances in which they have been modified or
limited. 1. There must be a conduct - acts, language, or silence - amounting to a representation
or a concealment of material facts. 2. These facts
must be known to the party estopped at the time
of his said conduct, or at least the circumstances
must be such that knowledge of them is necessarily
imputed to him. 3. The truth concerning these
facts must be unknown to the other party claiming
the benefit of the estopel, at the time when such
conduct was done, a.nd at the time when it wa.s
acted upon by him. 4. The conduct must be done
with the intention, or at least with the expectation,
that it will be acted upon by the other party, or
under such circumstances that it is both natural
and probable that it will be so acted upon. There
are several familiar species in which it is simply
impossible to ascribe any intention or even expectation to the party estopped that his conduct will
be acted upon by the one who afterwards claims
the benefit of the estoppel. 5. The conduct must

15
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be. relied upon by the other party, and, thus relying, he must be led to act upon it. 6. He must in
fact act upon it in such a manner as to cha;nge his
position for the u,orse; in other words, he must so
act that he would suffer a loss if he were compelled
to surrender or forego or alter what he has done
by reason of the first party being permitted to
repudiate his conduct and to assert rights inconsistent with it.' "
Also, see Utah cases of Cook v. Cook? 174 Pac. 2d 434,
and Cache Valley General Hospital v. Cache County, 67
Pac. 2d 639. There is no estoppel where one party has
not conducted himself so that another acts in reliance on
his conduct.
The elements of estoppel in the case at bar are conspicuous only by their entire absence. At the time plaintiff made his agreement with Valley Motor and at the
time he parted with his property there was no conduct
or representation upon the part of the defendant. None
is contended. Wherein did plaintiff change his position
for the worse by reason of any conduct on the part of
defendant~ The record clearly and beyond any doubts
refutes all such ideas. Quite the contrary, at the earliest
opportunity the defendant advised the plaintiff not to
a Iter or change his position.
There seems to be no doubt that the sales contract
between the plaintiff and Valley ~Iotor 'Yas breached by
the VaHey Motor and plaintiff undoubtedly believes that
they are no longer responsible. Of this fact 'Ye haYe no
knowledge. We do kno"T that in this action the plaintiff
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is grasping at straws in order to recoup his loss. We
know of no action that may be based on such a notion.
Plaintiff refers to V ailey as defendant's authorized
dealer and implies that there is some agency relationship
between defendant and Valley. The contract expressly
says to the contrary. And these contracts have uniformly
been upheld by the courts. Without extensive quotations,
we cite the following authorities :

Whi.tson et al v. Pacific Nash Motor Co., 215 Pac. 846.
S. B. McMaster, ln.c. v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 3 Fed.
2d 469.

Hudson v. Gulf Oil Co., 2 S. E. 2d 26.
Ford v. Willys-Overlwnd, Inc., 147 S. E.

82~

Anheuser-Busch v. Manion, 100 S. W. 2d 672.
Detroit Motor Appliwnce Co. v. Ta.ylor, 4 F. Supp.
2d 520.

Brown v. Cleveland Tractor Co., 251 N. W. 557.
Piper v. Oakland Motor Company, 109 A. 911.
Watson et al v. Oregon Moline Plow Co., 193 Pac. 222.
Gibbs v. Plymouth Motor Co.,. 166 S. E. 74.
Silverman v. Samuel Mallinger Co., 100 A. (2d) 715.
State v. W. T. Rawleigh Co., 174 S. E. 385.
Mathews Conveyor Co. v. Palmer-Bee Co., 135 Fed.
2d 73.
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We respectfully submit that the trial court was correct in directing a verdict for defendant. Plaintiff's evidence failed to show any title in plaintiff; failed to show
any right to possession as against defendant; and on the
contrary showed title in the property in defendant and
G. M. A. C., not plaintiff; and he failed to show any
estoppel against tlefendant under any existing or applicable law.
Respectfully submitted,
RICH, ELTON & MANGUM
Attorneys for Defendamt
307 Utah Oil Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah.
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